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Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery
Processes and Resources
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SUMMARY
As part of the FDIR (Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery) Project for the
Constellation Program, a task was designed within the context of the Constellation
Program FDIR project called the Legacy Benchmarking Task to document as accurately
as possible the FDIR processes and resources that were used by the Space Shuttle ground
support equipment (GSE) during the Shuttle flight program. These results served as a
comparison with results obtained from the new FDIR capability. The task team assessed
Shuttle and EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) historical data for GSE-related
launch delays to identify expected benefits and impact. This analysis included a study of
complex fault isolation situations that required a lengthy troubleshooting process.
Specifically, four elements of that system were considered: LH2 (liquid hydrogen), LO2
(liquid oxygen), hydraulic test, and ground special power.
1 AST, Technical Management, NASA Ames Research Center, CA 94035
2Computer Engineer, NASA Ames Research Center, CA 94035
3Information Technology Specialist, NASA Ames Research Center, CA 94035
I. Introduction and Objectives
Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) is a system engineering discipline that
addresses the design, development, operation, and life cycle management of components,
subsystems, vehicles, and other operational systems. The primary objectives of ISHM
are to maintain nominal system behavior and function, and to assure mission safety and
effectiveness under off-nominal conditions.
As an approach to developing a new Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR)
capability for the CxP (Constellation Program), the FDIR Project was chartered to build
and implement an FDIR capability for the new ground support equipment (GSE) system
being developed for the Aries launch vehicle.
The principal objective of the Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) project is
to mature the technology, define the architecture and the concepts of operation such that
ISHM tools are developed that will provide fault detection, isolation, and recovery for
CxP ground operations. This in turn will help meet launch availability rate through faster
fault isolation and recovery recommendation; develop the architecture for integrated fault
detection, isolation, and recovery (both ground and vehicle); as well as identifying paths
for certification of the FDIR architecture and assessments of the FDIR capability,
scalability, performance, costs, and benefits.
As part of the FDIR (Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery) Project for the
Constellation Program, a task was designed within the context of the Constellation
Program FDIR project called the Legacy Benchmarking Task to document as accurately
as possible the FDIR processes and resources that were used by the Space Shuttle ground
support equipment (GSE) during the Shuttle flight program. These results served as a
comparison with results obtained from the new FDIR capability. The task team assessed
Shuttle and EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) historical data for GSE-related
launch delays to identify expected benefits and impact. This analysis included a study of
complex fault isolation situations that required a lengthy troubleshooting process.
Specifically, four elements of that system were considered: LH2 (liquid hydrogen), LO2
(liquid oxygen), hydraulic test, and ground special power.
Legacy Benchmarking Task Members
Anthony R. Gross
	
ARC
	 Exploration Technology Directorate
Michael Gerald-Yamasaki	 ARC	 NASA Advanced Supercomputing Division
Robert P. Trent	 ARC	 Intelligent Systems Division
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II. Approach
Two basic approaches were taken to obtain the data necessary to meet the objectives of
this task:
1. Review and assess pertinent Shuttle-based documents:
a. System Assurance Analysis (SAA)
b. Critical Items List (CIL)
c. Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database, and
2. A field trip to KSC (Kennedy Space Center) to meet with Shuttle GSE
operators, including a tour of the related physical systems.
These two approaches will be described in the following sections.
1. a. System Assurance Analysis (SAA)
Liquid Hydrogen System
System Assurance Analysis of the Main Propulsion System Liquid Hydrogen Ground
Control System at Pad-A, B, MLP-1, 2, 3, and VAB
SAA09PP03-001, Rev. H, October 2007
File name: SAA09PP03-001_RevH_SAA_MPS_LH2_Part1.ppdf [1082 pages]
File name: SAA09PP03-001_RevH_SAA_MPS_LH2_Part2.pdf [1077 pages]
Liquid Oxygen System
System Assurance Analysis of the Main Propulsion Liquid Oxygen Control System for
the Launch Operations Area (Pad A/B) and the Vehicle Assembly Area
SAA09PP02-001, Rev. H, March 1990
File name: SAA09PP02-001_RevH_SAA_MPS_LOX.pdf [301 pages]
Hydraulics Support System
System Assurance Analysis of the Orbiter / Solid Rocket Booster Hydraulic Support
System
SAA09HS01-001, Rev. D, July 2006
File name: SAA09HS01-001_RevD_SAA_Orbiter-SRB_Hydraulics.pdf [212 pages]
Ground Special Power System
System Assurance Analysis of the Special Power System at the Kennedy Space Center
SAA00037, Rev. A, January 2008
File name: SAA00037_RevA_SAA_Special_Power_at_KSC.pdf [2013 pages]
1. b. Critical Items List (CIL)
Derived from the FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), the CIL documents
failure modes that are deemed “critical” by program definition. FMEA/CIL Criticality is
used throughout the Program for determining the appropriate level of visibility and risk
management. For details of the Critical Items List, see Appendix A below.
1. c. Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) Database
PRACA, as applied to the Space Shuttle Program, is designed to be both a process and a
database. The PRACA process attempts to provide consistent processing and resolution
techniques; supports effective technical investigation, analysis, and closure of reported
problems; and supports evaluation of test programs for effectiveness. These processes
also assure that problems will receive adequate visibility and review at appropriate levels
of management to support effective risk management and mission success.
2. Field Visit to KSC
A two-and-a-half-day trip to KSC was undertaken to meet with the domain experts and
system operators of the four selected GSE systems, as well as to observe the associated
hardware systems. This was necessary to provide ‘ground truth’ to the assessments made
from the PRACA database and the other reference documents that were made available to
this task.
The team met with the following KSC GSE operations personnel:
LH2/LO2 Systems
Hydraulics Support System
Ground Special Power System
Diane Stees
Mark Berg
Miles Ashley
Kip Anderson
Carla Rekucki
Slade Peters
Douglas Bearden
For each GSE system the processes that were used to identify, isolate, and repair major
problems, as well as approximate actual timings were reviewed and discussed. The
relevance and utilization of the PRACA database records identified by the Ames task
team were also reviewed and discussed.
In addition, two tours of the GSE hardware systems were provided in the vehicle
assembly building (VAB) and on the mobile launch platform (MLP), one for the
Hydraulics Test System, and one for the Ground Special Power System. Each tour
provided the opportunity for the Ames task team to gain a more in-depth understanding
of the system components and interactions, as well as to understand the actual fault
detection, isolation, and repair processes used by the system operators.
As a result of the analytical work done at Ames, as well as the discussions and tours at
KSC, the following observations, examples, conclusions, and recommendations were
developed:
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Observations and Processes Common to All Systems
Given that the objectives of the Legacy Benchmarking task were to identify the processes
and resources utilized in the FDIR processes for the Space Shuttle Program, the following
results for all four GSE systems became clear:
1. The PRACA database was of limited value in meeting the objectives of
this task. While it did provide a good, if sometimes confusing,
introduction to the four GSE systems, its overall lack of
comprehensiveness and consistency in data entry made it particularly
difficult to draw any significant conclusions. This observation was
corroborated by all of the KSC operators with whom we discussed this
topic. There were, however, a few example entries that will be cited in
this report that did provide useful information to this task.
2. Domain expertise and long experience possessed by many of the
system operators facilitated a very rapid response to, and identification
of, system anomalies and failures.
3. Careful and extensive maintenance procedures, developed over the
entire Space Shuttle Program, have served to minimize system
anomalies in many of the systems. The Ground Special Power System
is a particular example of a system with an extensive maintenance
program, in which Doug Bearden reported that more than 90% of
identified anomalies were found during the maintenance process.
4. Most of the GSE operators had only a rudimentary knowledge of the
three FDIR computer tools that are being developed as part of the FDIR
Project.
Observations, Processes and Examples - LH2/LO2 Systems
The information used for this section of the report includes:
• System Assurance Analysis (SAA) of the Main Propulsion System
Liquid Hydrogen Ground Control System (September 2007)
• System Assurance Analysis (SAA) of the Main Propulsion Liquid
Oxygen Control System (March 1990)
• PRACA database
• Report on Launch Countdown History
• Space Shuttle Operations and Infrastructure – A Systems Analysis of
Design Root Causes and Effects, Carey M. McCleskey
• Interviews with LH2/LO2 system engineers
The Critical Items List (CIL) in the SAAs for Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) and Liquid
Oxygen (LO2) contains a description of critical items, their failure modes, and detection
methods. The SAA for LH2 lists 196 items and the LO2 SAA lists 15 items in the CIL
(A revised SAA is in preparation lists 124 CIL items). Most of these items describe a
detection method of a visual on console and few assign a correcting action to mitigate the
critical failure effect.
The SAA for LH2 was updated in September 2007 and includes in the CIL the results of
a search through the PRACA database for test failures, unexplained anomalies, and other
failures experienced during ground processing activities for each item in the CIL. The
great majority of these faults were detected through routine operations, test, and/or
maintenance with routine recovery from the fault. Few of the PRACA records reported
failures of the CIL item in the critical failure mode. There were no catastrophic failures.
Additional searches and analysis of PRACA records yield similar results: a vast majority
of the problems reported is handled in a routine manner, that is, faults are detected in the
normal course of operations, and isolation and recovery are routine.
Engineers for these systems describe problems that are either:
• Really simple – a gauge or transducer fails; quick detection from a
visual observation on the console; and known recovery strategies due to
familiarity with problem are employed. Very short times for detection,
isolation, and recovery, a scale of minutes.
• Really complicated – unfamiliar – not seen before, not thought about
before and lack of understanding of problem, data gathering, data
analysis and trouble-shooting make for a lengthy process to isolate and
recover from these faults, a scale of days or weeks.
• Very few problems fall in between with a scale of hours
The complicated problems are described as stemming from:
• Faults from unanticipated errors or conditions
• Faults propagated from other systems or subsystems (outside the scope
of monitoring for the LH2/LO2 systems)
The process used for detecting problems, isolation, and recovery follows a fairly
predictable course:
1. A measurement anomaly, system indicator on the console, or an
announcement over the net of a problem (an example given by the
engineers was an announcement over the net of an imminent loss of
vehicle power)
2. Diagnose problem from available information or gather more
information about the problem (e.g., send a technician out to gather
information at the site)
3. Recovery procedures are employed
The time to diagnose a problem is highly dependent on the quality of immediately
available salient information. Once a diagnostic process enters into a phase of seeking
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additional information, the time to recovery increases dramatically (i.e. goes from “really
simple” to “really complicated”). Even a need for less complex information gathering,
such as a technician verifying equipment conditions at the site, requires lengthy
procedural costs in terms of time to recovery.
Three example cases for LO2 are presented below. This information was provided by the
systems engineer Miles Ashley from problem documentation, console logs, and personal
memory. The PRACA database, while presenting a comprehensive record of problems,
is less effective as a source for understanding the processes involved in diagnosing
problems and the length of time required from detection to recovery. A power loss
problem immediately subsequent to the STS-116 liftoff was discussed by the systems
engineers as a notably challenging problem. The PR for this incident as presented in
PRACA is summarized following the three example cases. Note the understated
presentation of this report. No hardware criticality was assigned to this PR.
Example Cases
1. Easy Troubleshooting Complexity
IPR PadA-2538 / PR S72-0813-00-001-1104
This PR happened during OMI G2115 LO2 pump test. The A86538 pump
common suction line temperature transducer FD GLOT0207A was reading
off-scale-high (-274 deg f) during the entire test in which LO2 temperatures
(-295 deg f) should have been experienced by the transducer.
Problem Type: Instrumentation failure
Indications: Off-scale high measurement
Troubleshooting steps:
1. Other measurements on same fuse/chassis/slot verified for
accuracy.
2. Measurement was not bypassed and test continued based on
single fault instrumentation failure. Fault classified as”
instrumentation” based on flow conditions and validity of other
measurements.
3. Post-test troubleshooting (pad electrical engineering) consisted
of using a 0-5 volt transducer checkout box. It confirmed a bad
transducer.
4. Transducer was replaced
Time of detection: approx 1538GMT 2/9/07
Time to diagnosis: <30 seconds (exact time cannot be determined, but operator
detected problem immediately after A4 block valve was opened. Procedure is to open
valve and then monitor for temperature <-290F. Time for this temperature shift from
ambient is seconds.
Time elapsed to diagnosis of problem: < 30 seconds
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2. Medium Troubleshooting Complexity
IPR-PADA-2523 / PR S72-0694-17-002-0203 A106425 Closed Indicator Is
On Should Be Off.
During OMI T2405 (Nose Cone Purge Panel System Leak Check) the
A106425 ball valve closed indicator (GLOX4193E) was on after the ET
nose cone purge redundant shutoff valve disable command (GLOK4190E)
was issued. The valve-closed indicator should have been off indicating the
valve was open.
Problem Type: Valve indicator not in expected state
Indications: A106425 valve position display indicated closed (expected state was
open)
Troubleshooting steps:
1. Testing continued around fault
2. Console engineer researched command pathway using
electrical schematics
3. Real time continuity check between valve indicator pins
accomplished by technician in field (continuity was good).
4. IPR troubleshooting plan developed (1/31/07)
5. System powered-up to record state of valve indication
6. Voltage measurements taken in remote distributor
7. Visually verified actual position of valve
8. System powered down, demated cables, shorted cable pins
together, power up and obtained resistance readings to check
for shorts.
9. Verified valve position
10. System powered down
11. Cross connect redundant shutoff valve cable, powered up and
verified valve position
12. Troubleshooting indicated the pneumatic valve was showing
open and closed at the same time due to an internal fault in the
position indicator. Command pathway was OK.
13. Valve was replaced.
Time of detection: 1429 GMT 1/29/07
Time to diagnosis: 1448 1/31/07
Time elapsed to diagnosis of problem: 2 days
3. Hard Troubleshooting Complexity
IPR PADA-2603 Helium Bubbling Delta Pressure Anomaly
During STS-117 launch countdown, both the primary and secondary helium bubbling
delta pressure transducers began indicating positive pressure at T-1 M44S. This was
after helium bubbling was terminated. The measurements should have been zero (or
near their bias for zero flow). Other indications of helium bubbling termination (GHe
bubbling supply pressure and primary/secondary control solenoid valve positions)
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were reading nominally at the time. Even though the flow indication on the secondary
transducer was greater than the LCC limit (ET-03), the countdown was continued
because this was considered a voting logic anomaly outside the LCC affectivity. Post-
launch troubleshooting revealed no discrepancies with GSE helium bubbling hardware.
Extensive post launch data analysis for STS-117 and previous missions indicate that
these transducers are very susceptible to upstream pressure fluctuations. This
pressure transducer activity has been seen at both pads on previous missions under
similar conditions (countdown time, GHe demand, etc). The differential pressure
transducers were also shown to indicate positive flow under reversed flow conditions.
The STS-117 anomaly occurred coincident with a high GHe demand from the hydrogen
vent flex line purge and subsided when this demand ended. Based on the data, the
anomalous behavior was caused by pressure disturbances in the helium supply during
periods of high demand and is an explained condition. The condition is expected to
recur under similar circumstances. Per Launch Director/ Test Team agreement, no
notification of a similar occurrence during launch countdown will be made. Hardware
modifications are under consideration to mitigate transducer sensitivity. Probable
cause: Explained Condition
Problem Type: Unexpected flow measurement (limit exceeded)
Indications: both primary and secondary helium bubbling delta pressure
measurements began indicating positive pressure. Secondary measurement
indicated a maximum of 0.152 psid, which exceeds the LCC ET-03 limit of
0.1 psid. Primary measurement indicated a maximum of 0.096 psid. Delta
press measurement range is 0–2 psid
Troubleshooting steps:
1. A No Hold LCC call was made at T-45S as required by LCC
IMPL-01 section 1.2.B LCC Outside of Time Period Effectivity.
Countdown was continued.
2. Extensive data review was conducted post launch (included
previous five missions)
3. Helium bubbling system passed leak check from panel supply
valve to GUCP connection flex hose with bubble soap and 45-
minute pressure decay check (6/12/2007)
4. Attempted to recreate delta pressure excitation by cycling LH2
purges ON/OFF in Terminal Count sequencing. No indications
seen on helium bubbling delta pressure measurements
(6/15/2007)
5. S72-0697-08 panel joints torqued per OMI T2408. Slight
movement seen on A78427 panel outlet bulkhead fitting to
tubing B-nut connection (6/18/2007)
6. S72-0697-08 panel leak and functional validation per OMI
T2404.001 complete with no anomalies (6/25/2007)
7. Internal seat leak check performed across A78411/412/413
valves. No leaks noted (6/27/2007)
8. low reversed through venturi by venting system through
A86903 vent valve. Delta press measurements indicated flow.
Supply pressure made erratic by rapidly cycling A86903 vent
valve open/close. Delta press measurements indicated flow
(7/6/2007)
Time of detection: 233620 GMT 6/8/07
Time to diagnosis: 7/7/07
Time elapsed to diagnosis of problem: 29 days
PRACA Report I-V6-442728 (Excerpts)
Project: UNKNOWN-UNKNOWN
Element: UNKNOWN
Engineering
Group: ECL
Current EICN: 117V-0054
Work Area: OPF-1
Detected During: S0007.200
Problem
Description: MULTIPLE PAD B HIMS LOST POWER
Disposition:
[Authors' note: The text that is displayed here is shown exactly as
it has been extracted from PRA CA. Any errors appear exactly as
they occur within PRA CA.]
IPR 117V-0054 BEGAN AS IPR 116V-0138 TO DOCUMENT
LOSS OF POWER TO PADB/MLP 1 HIMS SHORTLY AFTER
LIFTOFF OF STS-116, OV-103. SEVERAL
OTHERMANIFESTATIONS OF THE POWER LOSS WERE
SEEN BY FIRING ROOM PERSONNELWHILE ATTEMPTING
POST LAUNCH SECURING. LOX SYSTEM COMMAND
ANOMALIESWERE DOCUMENTED ON IPR PADB-3151. GVA
HOOD ANOMALIES WERE DOCUMENTED ON IPR PADB-
3152. COMMON DATA BUFFER (CDBFR) DATA READS (PVO
VS S FD) DIDNOT AGREE AFTER HIM RESETS WERE
DOCUMENTED ON IPR FR4-0383.TROUBLESHOOTING OF
THE ORIGINAL ANOMALY ISOLATED THE PROBLEM TO
ATRIPPED CIRCUIT BREAKER ON THE PAD B UPS 41/41A
OUTPUT DISTRIBUTIONPANEL CB 10. THE CB TRIP WAS
CAUSED BY A PHASE-TO-PHASE SHORT WITH IN APAD B
TO MLP1 INTERFACE CONNECTOR. THE WIDER LOSS OF
HIM DATA ANDCONTROL WAS DUE TO THE PAD B UPS
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41/41A MAINTENANCE ISOLATION SWITCHHAVING AN
UNINTENDED OVERLOAD PROTECTION WITHIN ITSELF.
INDUSTRYSTANDARDS REQUIRE UL APPROVED
SWITCHES HAVE THIS FEATURE, HOWEVER THEDESIGN
SPECIFICATION WAS FOR NO OVERLOAD PROTECTION.
IPR 116V-0138 WASTRANSFERRED TO IPR 117V-0054 TO
PROVIDE TRACKING VISIBILITY FOR THECORRECTION OF
THE GENERIC PROBLEMS WITH ALL LC-39 MLPS AND
PADS IDENTIFIED BY THE TROUBLESHOOTING OF THE
ORIGINAL ANOMALY. MULTIPLE MAXIMO WORK ORDERS
WERE OPENED TO PERFORM THE REPAIR OF THE
ORIGINAL ANOMALY AND TO CORRECT THE OTHER
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WHICH DELAYED THEPOST
LAUNCH SECURING. ATTACHMENT G LISTS THE MAXIMO
WORK ORDERS THATPERFORMED THE PAD B, PAD A,
MLP1, AND MLP2 REPAIRS. ATTACHMENT H ILLUSTRATES
THE WORK DONE FOR STS-117 ON PAD A AND MLP2. ALL
OTHER WORK IDENTIFIED BY THE TROUBLESHOOTING
OF THIS ANOMALY WILL STAND ALONE ONTHE WADS
OPENED FOR THOSE SYSTEMS. NO FURTHER WORK WILL
BE DONE ON THISIPR. IPR 117V-0054 WILL BE CLOSED AS
A DUPLICATE OF MAXIMO WORK ORDER772477.
ATTACHMENT 1 IS A COPY OF MAXIMO WORK ORDER
772477. CLOSE THIS IPR AS A DUPLICATE OF MAXIMO
WORK ORDER 772477.
Observations, Processes and Examples – Hydraulic Support System
The information used for this section of the report includes:
• System Assurance Analysis (SAA) of the Orbiter/SRB Hydraulic
Support System at Pad A, 8, VAB, SLF, SLS, OPF 1, 2, 3, and
MLP 1, 2, 3 (updated July 2006)
• PRACA database
• Report on Launch Countdown History
• Space Shuttle Operations and Infrastructure – A Systems Analysis
of Design Root Causes and Effects, Carey M. McCleskey
• Interviews with Hydraulic Support System systems engineers and
operators
Like the LH2 and LO2 systems, most of the Critical Items List (CIL) in the SAA for the
Hydraulics Support System describe a detection method of a visual on console and few
assign a correcting action to mitigate the critical failure effect. The SAA for the
Hydraulics Support System was updated in July of 2006 and includes in the CIL the
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results of a search through the PRACA database for test failures, unexplained anomalies,
and other failures experienced during ground processing activities for each item in the
CIL. The great majority of these faults were detected through routine operations, test,
and/or maintenance with routine recovery from the fault. Few of the PRACA records
reported failures of the CIL item in the critical failure mode. There were no catastrophic
failures. Additional searches and analysis of PRACA records yield similar results: a vast
majority of the problems reported is handled in a routine manner, that is, faults are
detected in the normal course of operations, and isolation and recovery are routine.
The categorization of the difficulty of problems has been given above in the LO2/LH2
section, as well as the sources of the complicated problems, and apply equally well to the
Hydraulics Support System.
One of the difficulties for this task that was identified by the Hydraulics Support System
engineers was in the problem identification and description process that is in current use.
When a problem is initially discovered, it is reported as an Initial Problem Report (IPR).
At this stage, the problem has not been isolated, only detected. At some later point in
time, duration and process undocumented, the problem becomes isolated and noted as a
problem report (PR). Thus, it becomes difficult to determine the time and resources
allocated in transitioning from a reported problem to an isolated and diagnosed problem,
ready for remediation.
Two particular Hydraulics Support System-related problems were identified and
discussed during our meetings at KSC that are out of the ordinary leak problems
associated with this system: vibration from a hydraulic pump during testing, and a strong
vibration in the hydraulic system when the brakes were applied to the orbiter.
In the first case, there was evidently a problem with one of the pumps in the Hydraulics
Support System. The problem was detected by the flight control team and relayed to the
Hydraulics Support System engineers. For some reason this pump anomaly was not
detected by the Hydraulics Support System team. This problem was still in the process of
being resolved at the time of our meeting at KSC, following several days of investigation.
This seems like the class of problem that the IMS tool might well have identified much
earlier in the sequence.
In the case of the orbiter brake problem a strong vibration was noted when the brakes
were applied to the orbiter during a routine test process. Several days and many avenues
of discovery were employed to isolate the problem. To date no definitive cause has been
found other than to assume that something in the design of the orbiter brake system is
responsible. A workaround was developed that ameliorated the problem so as to allow
the testing to proceed.
Observations, Processes and Examples – Ground Special Power System (GSPS)
The Special Power System supplies 28 Volts Direct Current (VDC) and 400 Hertz (Hz),
120 Volts Alternating Current (VAC) power to Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and
flight hardware at several locations throughout Kennedy Space Center. These locations
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include Pad-A, Pad-B, Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF)-1, OPF-2, OPF-3, Mobile
Launcher Platform (MLP) -1, MLP-2, MLP-3, Space Shuttle Main Engine Processing
Facility (SSMEPF) in OPF-3, and the Hypergolic Maintenance Facility (HMF).
In discussions with Ground Special Power System engineers, it was presented that the
system is highly redundant, with several backup systems designed to meet a variety of
failures and anomalies. Several of these backup systems were observed during our tour
of the GSPS. Long experience of many of the GSPS engineers facilitates the rapid
identification of potential and actual problems. In addition, it was indicated that normal
maintenance procedures were able to catch and repair the majority of the system
anomalies before they became a serious problem. Thus, to a large extent, under current
practice, the FDIR process in the GSPS is conducted by the operators themselves during
normal operations.
However, STS-116 provided a situation in which the GSPS failed in an unexpected
manner, which took several days to identify, isolate, and repair the fault. After liftoff,
multiple Pad B/MLP HIMS lost power, UPS 41/41A distribution panel circuit breaker 10
and the maintenance isolation switch (MIS) tripped. The failure was traced to a phase-to-
phase short in the 480-volt MLP/Pad B interface plug. Extensive electrical system and
material analyses were conducted to resolve this issue. Details of this incident may be
found in the presentation by the Pad B Power Outage Team on February 9, 2007 entitled
“STS-116 Shuttle Processing In-Flight Anomaly Pad B Post Launch Power Outage”.
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III. FDIR Project Tool Recommendations
The FDIR Project is developing three computer-based tools:
1. Inductive Monitoring System (IMS).
The IMS is a software product from Ames Research Center that learns
the normal state of a system from training data, and can subsequently
identify abnormal input data from that system by comparing the new
inputs with the known normal data.
2. Testability and Engineering Analysis Maintenance System (TEAMS).
TEAMS is a commercial software product from Qualtech Systems Inc.
made up of distinct components that can be used together or severally
in different configurations. The TEAMS model captures a system's
structure, interconnections, tests, procedures, and failures. The model
links these failures to the system's built-in tests, troubleshooting steps,
and repair procedures.
3. Spacecraft Health INference Engine (SHINE).
SHINE is a high-speed expert system and inference engine based upon
the experience and requirements that were collected over the years by
the Artificial Intelligence Research group at NASA/JPL in developing
expert systems for the diagnosis of spacecraft health.
During our meetings with the GSE operators, there were brief discussions of these three
FDIR tools and how they might be applicable to the operation and monitoring of the four
selected GSE systems. A summary of their first impressions as to the potential utility of
these tools, admittedly based on only a preliminary understanding of the tools’
capabilities, is shown below:
LO2/LH2 Systems
	
IMS
Hydraulics Support System 	 IMS, TEAMS
Ground Special Power System 	 IMS
Further development of the tools, plus demonstrations in an operational environment, will
undoubtedly clarify and strengthen their appreciation of the FDIR tools’ potential utility.
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IV. Conclusions
The primary considerations for effecting the time from fault detection to recovery are the
availability of information and the selection of important information from among the
available. The human operators of these processes are particularly capable through the
accumulation of knowledge and experience of selecting the important information to be
applied to the solution of a particular problem.
To have a positive impact on the time from fault detection to recovery FDIR tools must
provide either:
• An increase in the quantity of immediately available information about
the system and/or
• Assistance in selecting important information for fault detection,
isolation and recovery processes
However, simply increasing the quantity of available information will not necessarily
have a positive impact on the timeliness of fault detection, isolation, and recovery, if the
selection of important information is made more difficult.
The potential benefit of an FDIR system would include extension of available
information with assistance in selection of important information to be utilized. Simply
putting a sensor on everything would not necessarily improve the performance of fault
remediation. Access to broader cross-system information, for instance, would increase
the likelihood of important information reaching the right operator, but at the cost of the
need to filter increased quantities of unimportant background information.
Important information, too, might reach the right operator, but have little impact if it was
not understood why or how the information was important. The impact of knowing that
an air conditioning unit is going down, which cools a room full of GSP (Ground Special
Power) equipment, may not be immediately apparent to the LH2 operator. The
information may be extremely important for the GSP operator demanding full attention,
while only an indication of a remote potential fault in the LH2 system should a series of
backup and mitigation processes also fail.
The seemingly bipartite nature (really simple or really complex) of problems experienced
suggests that FDIR tools could have an impact by providing:
• External validation of the diagnosis of simple problems
• More information in a broader context of fault propagation possibilities,
filtered by relationship to an anomaly
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IV. Recommendations
Additional study of what information is available through console
display and other means and how it is presented to the console
operators during operations would be useful in a benefit analysis of
FDIR tools with respect to what information those tools provide and
how that information is presented. A metric of sorts might be
developed for the potential impact of FDIR tools on the selection of
important information over a quantity of available information.
• Extending the Legacy Benchmarking Task to the EELV GSE systems
will both provide data for a system that is closer to the CxP
configuration than is the Space Shuttle and provide a basis of
comparison and analysis of the current Shuttle system.
• As the development of the FDIR tools proceeds, we would recommend
that the end user community be involved as much as possible so as to
assure that the final versions of the tools are maximally useful and as
free of risk as possible.
• Testing the FDIR tools in as close to an operational environment as
possible will facilitate the effective development of the tools.
• Further work is clearly required to make the PRACA database system
more consistent and useful to the CxP community. Standards of
definition of input quantities as well as a clearer and more consistent
process of utilization. These developments could enable the PRACA
database to be more useful as a measurement tool for FDIR events, as
well as providing insight as to system performance.
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Appendix A – PRACA Criticality and Significance
Definitions
Critical Item List Criteria.
The following classification of failure modes is included in the CIL:
• All Functional Criticality 1 and 2 items (a single point of failure)
• All Functionality 1R items, where first failure could result in loss of mission, or next
failure of any redundant item could cause loss of crew/vehicle
• All Functional Criticality Category 1R and 2R items that fail one or more redundancy
screens
• An item which becomes Criticality 1 during intact abort, except for the system
causing the abort
Critical Items
Criticality	 Criteria
1/1 All
1 R/2 All
1R/3 Fails one or more redundancy screens
2/2 All
2R/3 Fails one or more redundancy screens
N/A Fails to meet Intact Abort requirements.
Criticality
Functional Criticality - Categorization of the effect of loss of all redundancy (like and/or
unlike, operational and/or standby) for a given function.
– Functional criticality for redundant items is based upon multiple failures which must
occur to result in loss of the system or component function.
– Any hardware item in the failure scenario contributing to or resulting in the effect shall
be considered as “redundancy” (like and/or unlike, operational and/or standby).
Functional	 Potential Effect or Failure:
Criticality
1	 Single failure which could result in loss of life or vehicle
1R	 Redundant hardware item(s), all of which failed, could cause loss of life
or vehicle
2	 Single failure which could result in loss of mission
2R	 Redundant hardware item(s), all of which failed, could cause loss of
mission
3	 No effect on mission, crew, or vehicle
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Hardware Criticality - Categorization of the worst-case singular direct effect of the
identified failure mode of a hardware item.
Hardware	 Potential Effect or Failure
Criticality
1	 Loss of life or vehicle
2	 Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item could cause loss of
life or vehicle
3	 No effect on mission, crew, or vehicle
Functional and Hardware Criticalities Combinations
Functional	 Hardware Potential Effect or Failure
Criticality	 Criticality
1	 1 1/1 - Single failure which could result in loss of life or
vehicle.
1 R	 2 1 R/2 - Redundant hardware item(s), all of which failed,
could cause loss of life or vehicle. First failure would result
in loss of mission or the next failure could cause loss of life
or vehicle.
1 R	 3 1 R/3 - Redundant hardware item(s), all of which failed,
could cause loss of life or vehicle. First failure has no
effect on mission, crew, or vehicle; second failure may
result in loss of mission.
2	 2 2/2 - Single failure which could result in loss of mission.
2R	 3 2R/3 - Redundant hardware item(s), all of which failed,
could cause loss of mission. First failure has no effect.
3	 3 3/3 - No effect on mission, crew, or vehicle.
These are the only valid combinations of Functional/Hardware Criticalities.
Hardware criticality does not equate to fault tolerance.
Significance
The problems are assigned a Significance Category commensurate with the level of risk
or impact the problem or related conditions introduce to the Program/Project.
Significance Category-1 Problems
If the Problem meets or could have resulted in any of the following criteria, it shall be
designated as a SC-1 problem.
a. In death of crew and/or loss of vehicle
b. Failure to achieve any major mission objectives/Incremental objectives
c. Involved Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL)
Failure Mode with Criticality Classifications 1, 1R, 1S
d. Interruption of schedule, equipment damage, cost overruns
e. Could have resulted in death or major injury/illness
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f. Could result in severe, acute, long term or permanent damage to the local ecology,
or contribute to regional problems
g. Problem is deemed a "constraint to flight"
h. Early termination of a mission
Significance Category-2 Problems
If the Problem meets or could have resulted in any of the following criteria, it shall be
designated as a SC-2 problem.
a. Involved FMEA/CIL Failure Mode with Criticality Classifications 2, 2R
b. Interruption of schedule, equipment damage, or cost overruns at a threshold
established by the Project or by the responsible center for the end item or for the
activity in work during problem reporting
c. Could have resulted in minor injuries (not covered by basic first aid) or illness
d. Could result in significant impacts to the local ecology, that are recoverable, but
would require substantial remedial actions
Significance Category-3 Problems
Problems required to be reported, but not meeting SC-1 or SC-2. Criteria will be
categorized SC-3.
Significance Category-4 Problems
Problems not required to be entered into the CxP PRACA information system may be
entered as Significance Category-4 problems. SC-4 problems shall be processed in
accordance with Project defined requirements.
Due to changes in NSTS 08126, the term “Hardware Criticality” was changed to “part
criticality”, and “Problem Failure Mode” was changed to “Functional Criticality”.
Hardware Criticality is described as: “Highest level criticality of the affected part É .Ó
Functional Criticality description changed to add more detail. Described as:
“Categorization of the effect of loss of redundancy for a given component or function in
the discrepant condition.” Or, better stated, the failure mode in the as-found condition.
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Appendix B – Problem Processing Requirements for
PRACA Data
Requirements for problem processing include the following:
• Uniform criteria for reporting, investigating and analyzing problems.
• Criteria to categorize (or assign) problem significance level to determine the
appropriate rigor of technical analysis and management visibility.
• Establish a common work-flow process for closed-loop problem processing, analysis
and closure.
• Consolidation of problem history in one central information system (the actual
PRACA database) using standardized problem report data elements, coding and
terminology
• Identification, implementation and documentation of corrective/preventative action
commensurate with the problem significance and risk of recurrence
• Capability to provide problem history across the applicable life cycle of the hardware
and software, operations and missions to support trending, evaluate effectiveness of
test programs, and the identification of precursors to more serious problems
• Information exchange and providing routine and tailored reports to support problem
analysis and support Cx (Constellation) Program/Project organizations such as Safety,
Reliability and Quality Assurance (SR&QA), Test and Verification (T&V), Systems
Engineering and Integration (SE&I), Configuration Management (CM), Logistics,
Ground and Mission Operations, Flight Crew Operations, Crew Exploration Vehicle
(CEV)/Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) maintenance and support, etc.
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